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Abstract 
Notion of direct participation in hostilities has been a complex and contentious phenomenon within the realm of 
armed conflict, especially where the armed conflict involves non state armed actors. The notion covers a 
situation where a person carries out specific acts which by their nature or purpose form part of the conduct of 
hostilities between parties to an armed conflict. In this circumstance, a person loses his immunity and becomes a 
legitimate target since he ceases to be harmless. Though it is usual that civilians and civilian objects enjoy 
immunity against direct attack, but where either of the belligerents is an armed group, there is problem of how to 
deal with members of such armed groups. This problem emanates from the fact that membership of the armed 
group is drawn from the civilian population while during armed conflict, the general population is made up of 
civilians and members of such group, and it creates a problem of identity. Likewise, the problem may also be 
attributed to lack of legal framework defining the status of members of armed groups and the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities. Therefore, the article analyses the notion of direct participation with a view to 
determining when civilian or a member of an armed group loses immunity against attack.   
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1.   Introduction 
The protection of civilians and civilian objects from the risk and dangers of hostilities during armed conflict has 
been a major concern of the international community. The immunity civilians enjoy is premised on their non-
involvement in military operations. But civilian immunity lasts for as long as he does not involve in an act that 
qualifies as direct participation in hostilities. In cases of non-international armed conflict where both or either of 
the parties to the conflict is an armed group, there is confusion in identifying members of such group from the 
general population. As such, it is difficult to identify and ascertain members of armed group who are carrying 
out attacks on behalf of the group from the civilian population. This poses a serious threat to the belligerent in 
determining the issue of legitimate target especially where the members of such armed group carryout a guerrilla 
attack. This raises a question as to when do a person is said to have directly participated in hostilities and when 
does he cease to participate.   
 
It is against this background that the article will look at the general concept of civilian as protected category. It 
will analyse the concept of armed group with a view to determining the status of its members for the purpose of 
attack at all times. The article equally considers the notion of direct participation in hostilities as an exception to 
civilian immunity. In doing so, it analyses the essential requirements for an act that constitute direct 
participation, and when does the act begin and end.    
 
2.      The Concept of Civilian and its Immunity 
The definition of civilian given in Additional Protocol was not assertive i.e. civilian is negatively defined with 
respect to combatants and armed forces. Civilian is any person who is not a member of the armed forces of a 
party to a conflict (Art. 50(1) API, Henkaert et al. 2005). So in an elaborate language, a civilian is any person 
who is not a member of the belligerent armed forces whether or not the authority upon which such a force 
depends is recognised by the adverse party or of associated militia, incorporated paramilitary police or volunteer 
corps, including organised resistance units, or of a levee en masse acting in immediate resistance to inversion 
(McCobrey  1990, Art. 50(1) API). Meanwhile, the civilian population comprises of all persons who are 
civilians. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of 
civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character (Art. 50 (2)(3) AP I). As it is virtually inevitable 
that during armed conflict individual members of the armed forces will be intermingled with the civilian 
population, and their presence shall not therefore deprive the civilian population of its character as such or of the 
protection to which it is entitled. Hence the presence of members of armed forces on leave amidst a large number 
of civilians does not mean that the group of civilians may be attacked (Baxter 1988).  In case of doubt whether a 
person is civilian or not, that person shall be considered and treated as a civilian (Ladan 1999). In practice, this 
means that a combatant may only open fire on persons of uncertain status or who find themselves in a location 
which puts their status in doubt such as a terrain where civilians are not expected if he is convinced that they are 
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enemy combatant, or civilian who loses protection as a result of direct participation in hostilities (Kalshoven 
2001). 
 
The reason underlying principle of distinction is the fact that civilians lack the right to directly participate in 
hostilities and civilians lose their entitlement to protection against direct attack for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities (Ibid). Under International Humanitarian Law, not only do civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities become legitimate target but they may also face prosecution under the national law of the state 
capturing them for simply taking up arms against legitimate constituted authority (Bellal 2009). Therefore, in the 
absence of rules protecting civilians, individuals who participated in hostilities in any way continued to do so at 
their own risk (Carmines 2008). Thus the safeguards that the law extends to civilians are premised upon their 
refraining from participation in belligerent activities and upon their identifiability as non-combatants (Baxter 
1975).  
 
On the contrary, there are contending views that civilians do not require certain extreme protection if the war is 
just. Where the war is just, collateral killing of civilians in connection with legitimate military operations is to be 
allowed (Maiese 2003). The other view is that the extent to which civilians are responsible for the actions of 
their government helps to determine what foreigners can do to the civilians, as in targeting or not targeting them 
during a war against aggression, and what foreigners can do on behalf of the civilians, as in a humanitarian 
intervention. The rationale behind this view is that people bear the responsibility of their governance and hence 
for their government’s action, whether or not the state is a free state. In other words, the guilt of joining the 
aggression should not be limited to the decision makers in the government or political and military leaders who 
approved the war alone since the war is for the interest of the state (Cornwell 2008). 
It has been asserted that in recent times, there is increasing involvement of civilian objects in military operations. 
Hence, there is need in conduct of hostilities not to only protect the lives and well-being of individual civilians 
and of the civilian population, but also to protect those objects that are civilian in nature (Baxter 1988). Civilian 
objects are defined as those objects which are not military objectives (Art. 52 API). It is also clear that in case of 
doubt whether an object is civilian object or military objective, the object shall be considered a civilian object. 
Additional Protocol I provides that in cases of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian 
purposes, such as place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used (Art. 52 (3) API). However, where an 
object is actually used in such a way as military quarters, command post or munitions depot it contributes 
effectively to military action. It may then be regarded as a  military objective, provided always that the condition 
requiring that its destruction offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time is also 
met (Kalshoven 2001).   
 
3.   The Status of Members of Organised Armed Group 
The membership of organised armed groups in the context of non-international armed conflict includes both 
dissident armed forces and other organised armed groups. Dissident armed forces essentially constitute part of 
states armed forces that have turned against the government (Melzer 2009). Their membership is determined by 
continue stay under the structures of the state armed forces to which they formerly belonged. Meanwhile, 
membership of organised armed groups for the purpose of principle of distinction cannot depend on abstract 
affiliation, family ties or other criteria prone to error, arbitrariness or abuse. Instead, membership must depend 
on whether the continuous function assumed by an individual correspond to that collectively exercised by the 
group as a whole, such as the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-state party to the conflict. Their 
membership is primarily drawn from the civilian population, but develops a sufficient degree of military 
organisation to conduct hostilities on behalf of a party to the conflict (Ibid). 
 
In practice, it is ambiguous whether members of armed opposition group are considered members of armed 
forces (combatants) or civilians (Sassoli 2008). Though, persons taking direct part in hostilities in non-
international armed conflict are sometimes labeled as combatants (UN General Assembly Res.2676 (xxv), sec. 
68-9 Cairo Declaration ). However, the designation combatants is only used in its generic meaning and indicates 
that these persons are legitimate target and do not enjoy the protection against direct attack accorded to civilians, 
but does not imply a right to combatant status or prisoner of war status as applicable in international armed 
conflict (Henkaerts et al. 2005).  States do not wish to confer the right to participate in hostilities and its 
corresponding combatant immunity on anyone in non-international armed conflict. Thus, it is obvious that there 
is no combatant status in non-international armed conflict and this automatically lead to the conclusion that, 
apart from the states armed forces, there are only civilians in non-international armed conflict. In other words, 
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members of organised armed groups could only be attacked when they are actually conducting hostilities but not 
at any other time (Droege 2008). 
 
Furthermore, to consider members of opposition armed group as civilians would certainly appear to create an 
imbalance between members of such groups and governmental armed forces. Application of this standard would 
imply that an attack on members of armed group is only lawful for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities while members of governmental armed forces remain legitimate target at any time (Henkaerts J., et al. 
2005). It was suggested that there could be different ways of approaching the lawfulness of targeting members of 
armed group in non-international armed conflict. The first approach is to treat any member of an armed group 
who has a continuous combat function although he remains a civilian, but the mere fact of having continuous 
combat function amounts to direct participation in hostilities and that person can therefore be attacked at all 
times (Droege 2008). Thus an individual recruited, trained and equipped by such a group to continuously and 
directly participate in hostilities on its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function even 
before he first carries out a hostile act (Melzer 2009). 
 
However, it not necessary that membership of an armed group must depend on the continuous active and hostile 
involvement in the conflict nor is it logically necessary that the continuous combat function of the individual be 
or consist of the active conduct of hostilities on behalf of the non-state party (Boothy 2010). To assert that the 
individual who is a member of the organised armed group must additionally assume continuous combat function 
before he can become continuously targetable narrows the notion of membership to a degree that lack sufficient 
justification and practical intuition (Ibid). The problem with the continuous combat function is that in the 
confusion and urgency of combat, where split-second decisions must be made on the basis of inadequate 
information (Baxter 1975), how can the commander or decision maker be expected to distinguish which persons 
are participating sporadically as against those with a continuous combat function?(Boothy 2010). Obviously, 
realities of war would not permit a commander to distinguish between members of armed groups on basis of 
continuous combat function at the battle field and sometimes the terrain may not give opportunity for careful and 
effective identification. Perhaps, continuous combat function approach may not really address the problem of 
members of organised armed group status as it appears to be impracticable taking cognizance of realities and 
terrain of war.  
 
The second approach is to define members of opposition armed groups which have a continuous combat function 
as combatants for the purpose of the conduct of hostilities so that they can be legitimate target at any time, but 
without  conferring on them a combatant status and combatant immunity as in international armed conflict 
(Droege 2008). This is a membership approach though it still attributed continuous combat function to a member 
before he can continuously be targeted. The approach is nevertheless linked to continuous combat function 
approach which leaves some questions unanswered.    
 
The third approach is to consider any person who is not formally a combatant i.e. not a member of the 
governmental armed forces as a civilian and can only be attacked during the actual times when he is directly 
participating in hostilities (Ibid). If everyone is a civilian, the fundamental principle of distinction becomes 
meaningless and impossible to apply. On a more practical note, to prohibit attacks by government armed forces 
on clearly identified fighters unless engaged by those fighters is militarily unrealistic, as it would obliged the 
government forces to act purely reaction to an attack while facilitating hit and run operations by the armed group 
(Sasoli 2008). 
 
Finally, how practicable it is for the government forces to determine membership of an armed group so long as 
the individual in question commits no hostile act and how can membership of the armed group be distinguished 
from simple affiliation with a party to the conflict for which the group is fighting i.e. membership in the political, 
educational or humanitarian wing of a rebel movement? (Ibid). Therefore, members of organised armed group 
are civilians who directly participate in hostilities and attributing continuous combat function may negate 
realities of war where decisions are taken in tension and within a split-second. It is impossible to identify a 
person as a member of an armed group and at the same time analyse his role by attributing continuous combat 
function before taking decision whether to shoot or not. But attribution of continues combat function is possible 
when the parties are not in the actual heat of the war. Though, it was observed that this position may create 
imbalance since it creates a conflict with one side having civilians as its members. That notwithstanding, since in 
non-international armed conflict it is the states armed forces fighting dissident armed forces or armed group, and 
it is the states that did not want to confer belligerent status to the armed group, it is logical to hold the view of the 
states and treat members of armed group as civilians simplisiter. In other words, they are to be treated as 
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civilians who directly participate in hostilities and consequently loses protection and immunity accorded to 
civilians.     
 
4. Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
In recent past, technological revolution in warfare has resulted in joining of segment of civilian population with 
each nation’s conduct of military operations and vital support activities (McDonald 2004). Thus, civilian 
employees far from the actual battle field began to perform an increasingly direct and mission critical support 
function in many military high-tech engagements. Civilian personnel who administer any battle command 
system, communications systems and high-tech weapon have become a highly specialized component of modern 
armed forces (Wenger 2008). Today, when wars are fought for principles and ideologies, civilians have 
increasingly taken an active part in the support of hostilities or in the hostilities themselves (Prosecutor Vs Jean 
Paul Akayesu, Baxter 1975). In modern warfare, all the nation’s activities contribute in some way or other to the 
pursuit of hostilities and even the people morale plays its part in this context (Carmines 2008). Even women are 
not left behind their participation in hostilities is also not a new phenomenon, for many of them have taken a 
more or less active part in war throughout the centuries (Krill 1985). Therefore, it is obvious that civilians 
supplement military capabilities in areas of active military operations and are meanwhile an indispensable part of 
modern warfare (Wenger 2008). 
 
Notwithstanding, civilians are accorded protection against attack unless and for such time as they take direct part 
in hostilities. Although when a civilian uses weapon or other means to commit acts of violence against human or 
material enemy forces, loss of protection against attack is clear and uncontested (Henkaerts 2005). There is 
neither international humanitarian law treaty that defined the concept of direct participation in hostilities nor 
does a clear interpretation of the concept establishes from state practice or international jurisprudence (Melzer 
2009). In other words, a precise definition of the term direct participation in hostilities does not exist and has not 
yet been clarified. And one of the areas of uncertainty affecting the regulation of both international and non-
international armed conflicts is the absence of a precise definition of the term direct participation (Henkaerts 
2005). Therefore, problem of determining what amount to direct participation exists in relation to all civilians 
including private military companies (Gillard 2006). 
 
In line with this fact, many scholars have contributed toward elucidating the concept of direct participation in 
hostilities as to what conduct amounts to direct participation and when does direct participation begin and end? 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has contributed immensely in this respect with the interpretive 
guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities. According to ICRC interpretive guidance, the notion 
of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of 
hostilities between parties to an armed conflict (Melzer 2009). In the words of Kalshoven, to take a direct part in 
hostilities must be interpreted to mean that the person in question perform hostile acts which by their nature or 
purpose are designed to strike enemy combatants or material (Kalshoven 2005, Carmines 2008 ). Direct 
participation in hostilities also implies a direct causal relation between the activity engaged in and harm done to 
the enemy at the time and place where the activity occurs. In other words, to take a direct part in hostilities is 
usually taken to mean to engage in a specific attack(s) on an enemy combatant or object during a situation of 
armed conflict (McDonald 2004). Therefore, the notion of direct participation in hostilities does not refer to a 
person status, function or affiliation, but to his engagement in specific acts that meet the requirements of direct 
participation in hostilities (Melzer 2009). 
 
It is generally observed that in recent time, the increase involvement of civilian in contemporary phases of 
warfare has resulted from the technological advancement and the emergence of complex and sophisticated 
weapons that require joint and/or coordinated efforts of two or more persons with high-tech computer knowledge 
for the purpose of identifying and designing the target location before an attack is lunch. Consequently, civilians 
are often used in such high-tech operations during conduct of hostilities and it increases their risk of involvement 
in acts likely to qualify them as directly participating in hostilities. Therefore, it increases civilian casualty and 
exposure to risk and dangers of hostilities. 
 
5.   Essential Requirements for Direct Participation in Hostilities  
For a specific act to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, it must satisfy three cumulative essential 
requirements- threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus. To meet the threshold of harm, the act 
must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or 
alternatively to inflict death, injury or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (Ibid). The 
qualification of an act as direct participation does not require the materialization of harm reaching the threshold 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.21, 2014 
 
47 
but merely the objective likelihood that the act will result in such harm i.e. harm which may reasonably be 
expected to result from an act in the prevailing circumstances (Ibid). Furthermore, a conduct of a civilian cannot 
be interpreted as adversely affecting the military operation or military capacity of a party to the conflict simply 
because it fails to positively affect them (Ibid). However, Boothy added that an act of civilian may positively 
contributes to the fighting position of his own party to the conflict, while not necessarily translating into 
immediate loss to the opposing party and it will amount to direct participation in hostilities. It is not necessary 
that the act must adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of the party, it suffices where the 
act is likely to at least cause death, injury or destruction (Boothy 2010).       
 
The requirement for direct causation requires that there must be a direct causal link between a specific act   and 
the harm likely to result either from that act or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes 
an integral part (Melzer 2009). To qualify a specific act as direct participation in hostilities, there must be a 
sufficiently close causal relation between the act and the resulting harm. Therefore, individual conduct that 
merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a party to harm its adversary or which otherwise indirectly causes 
harm is excluded from the concept of direct participation in hostilities, because the primary purpose of the word 
‘direct’ was to ensure that general contribution to the war effort was excluded as a ground for the loss of civilian 
immunity (Carmines 2008). Worthy of note is the fact that where a specific act does not on its own directly cause 
the required threshold of harm, the requirement of direct causation would still be satisfied where the act 
constitutes an integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly in one causal step cause 
harm that reaches the required threshold. However, this standard negate the contemporary phases of warfare 
where attacks are achieved through a multiplicity of integrated steps, and the notion of causal step leading to the 
hostile act seems difficult to apply (Boothy). 
 
Meanwhile, the requirement for belligerent nexus requires the act to be specifically designed to directly cause the 
required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (Melzer 2009). In 
other words, armed violence which is not designed to harm a party to an armed conflict, or which is not designed 
to do so in support of another party cannot amount to participation in hostilities. Belligerent nexus relates to the 
objective purpose of the specific act and it is not influence by mental ability or willingness of persons to assume 
responsibility for their conduct (McDonald 2004). Thus civilians forced to directly participate in hostilities or 
children below the lawful recruitment age may lose protection against direct attack (Melzer 2009). The position 
seems to be in consonance with battle field realities where it is impracticable for an army to sight a person 
shooting at him, and yet wait to ascertain the mental ability or willingness of the person in carrying the attack 
before he could react. Meanwhile, in cases of individual self-defence; defending others against violence 
prohibited under international humanitarian law; in case of exercising power or authority over person or territory 
and cases of inter civilian violence lacks belligerent nexus required for qualification as direct participation in 
hostilities (Ibid). To crown it all, a specific act must satisfy all the three criteria of threshold of harm, direct 
causation and belligerent nexus before it qualifies as direct participation in hostilities. 
 
Having captured the picture of what constitute direct participation, the question that arises next is what is the 
time for direct participation in hostilities? When does it begin and end? There is no certain answer to these 
points, however, military logic suggest that the period encompasses both the time during which the civilian is 
obviously approaching the chosen target with a view to carry out his hostile act and the time he needs to 
withdraw from the scene after the act (Kalshoven 2001). So, where a specific act requires deployment, such 
deployment and return from the deployment constitute integral part of the act in question. The return from the 
execution of a specific hostile act ends once the individual in question has physically separated from the 
operation. For instance, by laying down, storing or hiding the weapons or other equipment used and assuming 
activities distinct from that operation. However, there would still be a problem with how to categorize the period 
when the person cleans and prepares his weapon for future use, and equally significant, is how to classify the 
continuing activity of storing, retaining and/or concealing the weapon for future operation (Boothy 2010). 
Therefore, lack of legal framework defining direct participation in hostilities results in the ambiguity surrounding 
when direct participation begins and ends especially in cases of repeated attack- whether cleaning and storing 
ammunition for subsequent attack form part of direct participation.   
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The notion of direct participation in hostilities entails a situation where a person performs hostile acts which by 
their nature or purpose are designed to strike enemy combatants or material. The act most satisfies three 
cumulative requirements- threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus for it to qualify as direct 
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participation in hostilities. Where a civilian involves in an act that qualified as direct participation in hostilities 
he automatically loses immunity against attack. Likewise, members of armed group can be treated as civilians 
who take a direct part in hostilities and consequently they lose immunity against direct attack. For any member 
of organized armed group who have continuous combat function is a legitimate military target subject to attack 
at all times.  
 
It is suggested that International Committee of the Red Cross in collaboration with member states to Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols should work out a legal framework that provides a definite status for 
members of organised armed group with unambiguous position. So that there would be a legal framework that 
define where and when a member of organised armed group becomes a continuous legitimate military target. It 
is further suggested that there should be a legal framework defining the notion of direct participation in 
hostilities with specific parameter for determining its beginning and end. 
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